Abstract
approach to firstly present a theoretically-underpinned overview of some key challenges 9 faced by elite team leaders. The paper then moves to propose some evidence-based 10 recommendations -as grounded in the aforementioned challenges, current literature, and our
11
own applied experience -for the development and deployment of expertise in elite team 12 leaders' supporting psychologists.
13

Part 1: The Challenge -What do we Need to Help Elite Performance Team Leaders do?
14
To best contextualize the requirements for practitioner expertise in this area, and 15 reflecting the major elite sport systems in Europe and beyond, we now present a synopsis of 16 the challenges commonly faced by the managers 2 of professional sport performance teams 17 and the performance directors 3 (hereafter PD) of Olympic sport performance teams.
18
Ensuring integration with current theory, these challenges are rooted to the multidirectional 19 orientation recently suggested and corroborated as critical in elite sports team leadership 20 1 1 In this paper, "sport psychologist" refers to a practitioner who is fully accredited/regulated by a recognised professional governing body, and who has the appropriate experience and expertise to perform at this level. We should point out that, just as only some can become high level athletes, so only some should work with them. 2 Please note that "manager" is used as a general label for any figure with responsibility for a professional sport organization's performance department (therefore encompassing the range of titles used by different sporting systems: e.g., team manager, head coach, director of sport). 3 The performance director is the figure responsible for an Olympic sport organization's performance department. Boards of Directors), and lateral influences (i.e., the media, fans/public). Additionally, these 5 presented challenges are also rooted to the principles of decentred theory; a perspective 6 recently applied in research on elite team leadership activity (cf. Cruickshank et al., 2013 ). Specifically, this approach rejects the notion of unchallenged, top-down leadership processes 8 and instead asserts that all individuals in a social system work to their own situated interests 9 (which may or may not align with the leader) and therefore generate an inherently contingent,
10
conflicting, and contested mode of interaction. 4 
11
Evidence for the relevance and significance of internal power dynamics and external 12 interactions/interference is now offered through original data which we have gathered for our 13 published and on-going work in elite team leadership processes. Additionally, and to convey 14 the pervasiveness of these challenges, pertinent media reports are also included. While the 15 majority of this evidence is set within our own British context, our experiences of working in 16 elite team performance around the world, the perceptions of our international colleagues, and 17 a regular perusal of global media reports suggest that these fundamental social challenges are 18 common to elite sport systems across a host of different countries. Additionally, and despite 19 variation in how these factors are specifically "played out" within and across professional and Olympic team environments (which must of course be considered for contextually-sensitive 21 practice), their shared general nature provides a basis on which to explore the core requisites 22 and features of practitioner expertise in high performance domains. 
23
Contexts and Challenges of Elite Sport Performance Departments
13
Beyond rejecting or resisting management preferences, decisions, and actions, elite 14 athletes also often play an active-disruptive role in pursuit of their own interests and agendas.
15
At the extreme end of this agency, take the player-driven revolt which led to the sacking of 16 the New Zealand Rugby League Coach in 2008 (Mascord, 2008) We acted as a team. To strike was the decision of a squad who felt lonely, who 20 believed that no-one had stood up for them and who had a message to convey. We 21 went too far. It was a very awkward decision, a big mistake. It was completely stupid.
22
But there were so many problems (Brookfield, 2010 ).
23
As well as the significant interplay of "player power" through groups, active disruption from Problematically, this quandary is often worsened by the glare of a highly critical media and 4 public audience as well as when those "above" (i.e., the Board) and "below" (i.e., the 5 athletes) interact directly over performance issues. For instance, after his sacking by Chelsea Performance Sport New Zealand. In a British context, the growing role of UK Sport in
13
Olympic performance systems causes many issues for PDs. Indeed, the strict and incessant 14 outcome-orientation of this group is often a significant drain on the PD; ironic in that the PD
15
is the individual whom this agency needs to perform at their best to optimize medal return! In such an environment, and with leaders who require support beyond that available from 10 their staff, the sport psychologist should therefore be working within a professional judgment such as an Olympics or in a media-dense sport such as soccer, daily. In this way, maintaining 22 an optimum balance for the policy-action cycle will certainly require the sport psychologist to simple yet hard to achieve example, the effective psychologist must provide a sounding board 7 and an almost virtual environment through which the manager/PD can explore the 8 consequences and merits of different approaches. Furthermore, the psychologist must also be take action must be set against short (e.g. we need the wins), medium (e.g. I need to develop their commitment to this playing style) and long term (we need a secure and consistent 1 culture) agendas simultaneously.
2
The point here is that optimum actions (for example, how sympathetic and supportive 3 the psychologist is with a player struggling to fit the new style) must take into account both than three) will lead to a less than optimum process. Accordingly, and once again, the 8 implication emerges that team leaders' and psychologists' action needs to be shaped to 9 provide a decision which is coherent across team management, and which is designed and 10 deployed as a dynamic best-fit to the demanding, high ego, high status, and self-interested 11 individuals which often characterize elite domains ).
12
Of course, the operation of covert agendas (i.e., those which some performers and standards and credibility are to be sustained.
2
We briefly consider some of the "code of conduct" issues which such an approach 3 inevitably raises in the next section. For the moment, however, we suggest that there will 4 almost inevitably be times when a psychologist operating in elite sport will be required to 5 take, or at least advise on and keep confidential, actions which may well be professionally or 6 even personally harmful to some parties. In such an environment, maintaining client trust 7 and personal integrity will, especially in the long-term, necessitate a more forthright and Jones, 2014). This is not to say that a "team of psychologists" approach will never work; 21 indeed, the first author established such a system to cater for support across a multi-centre environment, as is increasingly common in large Olympic sport programmes. ego (and financially) rich worlds which characterize many of our high performance settings.
16
In sum, we would suggest that it is better to be straight than devious, an approach which 17 surely resonates closely with the spirit of our codes of conduct! Manuscript submitted for publication. 
